r, e.g. you are one with yourself both in form and São Paulo FC in matter; Itálie Dres Dámské and again, (3) if the definition of its primary essence is one; e.g. equal straight lines are the SC Internacional same, and so are equal and equal-angled quadrilaterals; there are many such, but in these equality constitutes unity.
Things are like if, not being absolutely the same, nor without difference in respect of David Luiz Fotbalové Dres their Maillot Schweinsteiger concrete substance, they are the same in form; e.g. the larger square is like the smaller, and unequal straight lines are like; they are like, but not absolutely the same. Other things are like, if, Isco Fotbalové Dres having the same form, and being things in which difference of degree is possible, they have no difference of degree. Other things, if they have a quality that is in form one and same-e.g. whiteness-in a greater or less degree, are called like because their form is one. Other things are called like if the qualities they have in common are more numerous than those in which they differ-either the qualities in general or the prominent qualities; e.g. tin is like silver, qua white, and gold is like fire, qua yellow and red.
Evidently, then, ‘other’ and ‘unlike’ also have several meanings. And Maurice Richard Tröja the other in one sense is the opposite of the same (so that everything is either the same as or other than everything else). In another sense things Olympique Marseille Dresy are other unless both their matter and their definition are one (so that you are other than your neighbour). The other in the third sense is exemplified in the objects of mathematics. ‘Other or the same’ can therefore be predicated of everything with regard to everything else-but only if the things are one and existent, for ‘other’ is not the contradictory of ‘the same’; which is why it is not predicated celta de vigo Dresy of non-existent things (while ‘not the same’ is so predicated). It is predicated of all existing things; for everything Sendai Vegalta Dresy that is existent and one is by its very nature either one or not one with anything else.
The other, then, and the same are thus opposed. But difference is not the same as otherness. For the other and that which it is other than need not be other in some definite respect (for everything that is existent is either other or the same), but that which is different is different from some particular thing in some particular respect, so that there must be something identical whereby they differ. And this identical thing is genus or species; for everything that differs differs either in genus or in species, in genus if the Hamburg Dresy things have not their matter in common and are not generated out of each other (i.e. if they belong to different figures of predication), and in species if they have the same genus (’genus’ meaning that identical thing which is essentially predicated of both the different things).
Contraries are different, and contrariety is a kind of difference. That we are right in this supposition is shown by induction. For all of these too are seen to be different; they are not merely other, but some are other in genus, and others are in the same line of predication, Middlesbrough Dresy and thlinks:
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